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Abstract
The paper re-visits the literature on real rigidities in New Keynesian
models in the context of an economy at the zero lower bound. It identies
strategic interaction among price- and wage-setting agents in the economy
as an important determinant of both optimal policy and economic dynamics
in deep recessions. In particular, labour market segmentation is shown to
have a signicant inuence on the length of the forward commitment to
keep interest rates at zero, the magnitude of the scal policy responses as
well as ination volatility in the economy under optimal policy.
JEL Classi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1. Introduction
Keeping the nominal interest rate at zero even after the natural rate has
recovered to positive values, enacting an increase in government spending or,
more controversially, introducing tax increases have all been discussed as viable
stabilization policy strategies in New Keynesian economies subject to deep
recessions. This paper studies the extent to which the desirability of such
strategies is a¤ected by the nature of interaction among rms and households
in the product and labour markets. It highlights that both the optimal length of
time spent at the zero bound, the strength of policy responses, and the magnitude
of observed macroeconomic outcomes under optimal policy (such as ination rates)
are signicantly a¤ected by the degree of strategic complementarity in price- and
wage-setting. We show that the structure of the labour market (in particular,
whether or not labour markets are segmented) has a profound e¤ect on both
optimal policy and macroeconomic outcomes.
The importance strategic complementarity between price- or wage-setters has
received considerable attention in the context of the ability of New Keynesian
models to replicate observed persistence in the real economy following monetary
policy shocks.1 However, the literature on stabilization policy at the zero lower
bound has so far largely ignored the implications of strategic interaction in
price and wage setting for policy under the specic circumstances presented to
policy makers by the presence of this nonlinearity.2 Exploring the interaction
between strategic complementarity and optimal policy at the zero lower bound
is important, as seemingly innocuous assumptions about market structure or
structural parameters often taken in the literature have non-trivial implications
1See Edge (2002), Woodford (2003, Chapter 3) or Ascari (2003), for example.
2Most recently, Eggertsson and Singh (2016) discuss sector specicity of labour markets
in a paper on zero-lower-bound issues. They concentrate on the analytical usefulness of this
assumption, and do not explore the implications for policy or economic dynamics.
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for the way we should think about goodpolicy and what is desirable to achieve
in terms of outcomes in the economy.
In this paper, we study a New Keynesian setup in which prices and/or wages
are sticky, and the labour market can be either non-segmented (or economy-wide)
or segmented (sector-specic). Government spending is valued and the income tax
policy is determined endogenously. This economy is subject to a large fundamental
shock as a result of which optimally set nominal interest rates hit the zero lower
bound.3 While Correia et al. (2013) have shown that a su¢ ciently rich set of
policy instruments can completely circumvent the liquidity trap problem, and
may even enable policy makers to implement the rst best outcome, in this paper
we study a world in which solutions that are costless in welfare terms are ruled
out. In addition to setting the tax on wage income and government spending,
the authorities can use forward commitment concerning interest rates to stabilize
the economy in a liquidity trap.4 Eggertsson and Woodford (2006) and Nakata
(2011) have also studied a simultaneous determination of optimal monetary and
scal policy in a deep recession but did not consider in greater depth the role of
wage stickiness and, in particular, strategic complementarities. Christiano et al.
(2009) and Christiano (2010), whilst including wage stickiness, only examined the
functioning of ad hoc (tax) policies and concentrated on the implied real economy
e¤ects.
3The policy prescriptions obtained in our framework are standard given that the source
of the downturn in our model is also standard a shock to the rate of time preference of
agents. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2013) and Mertens and Ravn (2014) have questioned the
usefulness of such conventional policy advice if the cause of the severe downturn in the economy
is that expectations are not well-anchored. We believe this discussion is beyond the scope of the
intended contribution of this paper.
4Such a set of policy tools better reects the policy decisions implemented by central banks
and governments around the developed world in the wake of the most recent severe recession.
See, for example, European Commission (2009) or Council of Economic Advisers (2010). Only
the United Kingdom have on a one-o¤ basis implemented a policy concerning the general VAT
rate that is vaguely in line with Correia et al. (2013).
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We nd that the optimal response in the ination rate to a given large
shock varies by as much as one order of magnitude depending on whether we
assume sector-specic labour markets or an economy-wide labour market. We also
highlight the importance of key parametric assumptions for policy and outcomes
at the zero lower bound. In particular, we show that depending on the nature
of nominal wage adjustment in the economy, a linear production technology may
justify relatively high expected ination or at the other extreme strict price-
level targeting strategies. The di¤erences are smaller with a concave production
function.
Intuitively, in the presence of nominal price and/or wage rigidities (à la
Calvo), features that force price- or wage-optimizers to consider more carefully
the potential adverse implications of demand reallocations for their prots act to
supress relative price adjustment following shocks. It matters, in particular, if
real wage changes are seen as an economy-wide phenomenon or something that
a¤ects particular industries only. In the latter case, sectoral price determination
needs to take into account the consequences of price-change-induced demand
re-allocation for sectoral wages (and prots). An implication of this is more
caution in price re-optimization, less ination volatility and more volatility in real
variables. The latter is manifested in both larger response magnitudes and longer
duration of adjustment following shocks. Such considerations are, understandably,
exacerbated by factors such as the intersectoral substitutability of di¤erent types
of products and labour, and the nature of the production technology. This is
something we demonstrate in the paper too.
The optimal policy response in the presence of conditions for dampened
adjustment is to act more forcefully. In terms of monetary policy action, the
commitment to keep interest rates at zero lasts longer after the zero bound ceases
to bind once real rigidities are taken into account. Krugman (1998) famously
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argued that monetary policy is not ine¤ective in a liquidity trap as long as it
is able to a¤ect ination expectations. Expectations of higher ination lower
the current real interest rate and act to stimulate demand even if the short-term
nominal interest rate is stuck at zero. It has been shown in the context of standard
New Keynesian models that the monetary policy consistent with such evolution
of prices involves a commitment to keep the nominal interest rate at zero for
some time after the zero bound ceases to bind. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003),
Jung et al. (2005) and Adam and Billi (2006) have shown this formally, whilst
arguing for very modest rates of expected ination. Our paper demonstrates
that the optimal duration of the commitment to keep interest rates at zero as
well as the implied ination rates vary considerably depending on the assumed
degree of strategic complementarity in price and wage setting decisions. Contrary
to what one might expect, longer forward commitment does not translate into
larger ination responses. It merely mitigates their absence. The point of a
stronger monetary policy response is primarily to engineer a larger boom in the
real economy in the future which reduces desired savings and stimulates demand
in the short run. This is consistent with a thought experiment in Werning (2012)
who examined the case of a simple economy in a liquidity trap with articially
xed prices. We show that such a simple exercise is a close approximation of
optimal dynamics in a sticky-price sticky-wage New Keynesian economy with a
linear production technology.
When real rigidities are stronger, other tools in the conventional stabilization
toolbox are applied more forcefully too: the desired short-term government
spending expansion is larger and the government must commit itself to greater cuts
in the future. A policy strategy of leaning against the windin which government
spending is rst raised and then cut whilst the nominal interest rate is at the zero
bound has been proposed by Gertler (2003) due to its impact on the natural rate
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of interest. Nakata (2011) and Werning (2012) have shown this to be a feature
of optimal policy in a liquidity trap. Werning (2012) argues that the mentioned
strategy is almost entirely opportunisticand the motivation for it has little to
do with stabilization.5 We provide evidence supporting this view too. Since we
study optimal policy from a timeless perspective, in line with Schmidt (2013), we
do not nd large gains in terms of the stability of nominal or real variables as a
result of the deployment of government spending.
The idea that an income tax hike is desirable at the zero bound due to its e¤ect
on (expected) ination and the real interest rate has been discussed in Benigno
(2009), Eggertsson (2011) and Nakata (2011). In Correia et al. (2013), tax policy
is best thought of as a price stabilization tool given its impact on the marginal
cost in the economy. In our model, we also observe gains in price stability once tax
policy is activated in addition to the other tools in the policy makers toolbox.
Overall, the budgetary impact of stabilization measures is close to zero in the
short term.
We also examine the state-dependency of our results as in Burgert and Schmidt
(2014). We nd that higher initial indebtedness tends to amplify the di¤erences
across economies with di¤erent labour market structures. In particular, the
optimal ination response is even larger in the economy with economy-wide labour
markets relative to the alternatives considered when initial debt is high. Tax policy
deployed more forcefully bears the brunt of the initial adjustment in debt. This
can be an increase or a cut depending on where the economy starts relative to its
steady state.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces di¤erent
versions of a baseline model that form the basis for our analysis of the design
5In a public nance context, opportunisticpolicy makers will seek to increase the provision
of public goods when the marginal rate of transformation between public and private goods falls.
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of optimal monetary and scal policies in a liquidity trap. This model is
parameterized and solved using the nonlinear method explained in great detail
in Nakata (2011). The results of the numerical exercise are presented and related
to the existing literature in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2. The model
This section describes a model of an economy with sticky nominal wages and
prices akin to Benigno and Woodford (2005) which builds on Erceg et al. (2000).
The government authorities in our economy set the interest rate, government
spending and the distortive labor income tax rate to stabilize the economy. Shocks
to the discount factor are the only source of disturbance in the model, and we
examine the economys adjustment under perfect foresight along a deterministic
path following a single large innovation to the discount factor. If this innovation
was small, it could be fully o¤set by a cut in the nominal interest rate, and other
policy instruments would not play a role in stabilizing the economy.
Whilst the model is closer to the widely used medium-scale setups than the
more common simple stylized frameworks in terms of its complexity, it should still
be thought of only as a relatively tractable environment for the study of policy
interactions. The quantitative results from this model are especially subject to this
caveat. The main lessons concerning policy coordination should, however, apply
more generally, as the circumstances we examine are implicit in all larger-scale
models.
2.1. The discount factor shock
An exogenous shock to the discount factor of agents, representing a change in
their preferences in terms of consumption and savings, is used to capture the idea
of a severe demand-led contraction in the economy.
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As in Nakata (2011), we assume that the discount factor at time t+s is dened
as s, i.e. s shows the relative di¤erence between discount factors at time t+ s
and t+ s+ 1: The following assumptions about the discount factor shock hold in
the model
0 = 1;
1 = 1 + ";1;
s = 1 +  (s 1   1) for s > 2:
The discount factor shock is realized before optimization decisions are made. It
holds that ";1 > 0 and the shock persists, but decays with the time at the rate
0 <  < 1:
2.2. Households and the labour market
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive households located on the
unit interval [0; 1]. Those of type j choose private consumption of a nal good
Ct(j) and holdings of one-period risk-free nominal government bond Bt(j) to
maximize welfare given by
Et
1X
s=0
s
sY
k=0
k
"
Ct+s(j)
1 C
1  C
  N;0
Nt+s (j)
1+N;1
1 + N;1
+ G;0
G
1 G;1
t+s
1  G;1
#
subject to the constraint
Pt+sCt+s(j)+
Bt+s(j)
Rt+s
6 (1 n;t+s)Wt (j)Nt+s(j)+Bt+s 1(j) TLSt+s+Dt+s (2.1)
The variable Pt is a price of a nal good, Rt stands for the gross nominal return
on the bond, while n;t is the labor income tax rate. TLSt refers to the lump sum
taxes (transfers) that may be paid by (to) the households. The prots generated
by monopolistically competitive rms are transferred to households in the form of
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lump-sum dividends Dt. This maximization exercise yields the Euler equation
C
 C
t = EttRtC
 C
t+1 
 1
t+1; (2.2)
where t = Pt=Pt 1 is price ination. The Euler equation is not indexed by the
households, as we assume completeness of insurance market against idiosyncratic
shocks and that the initial holdings of assets are the same across households.6
Therefore, Ct(j) = Ct for all j and t:7
Households of type j supply a di¤erentiated labor service Nt (j) at a wage rate
Wt(j). There is a perfectly-competitive employment agency that aggregates the
supplied di¤erentiated labor in an index according to the standard Dixit-Stiglitz
formula
Nt =
Z 1
0
Nt (j)
" 1
" dj
 "
" 1
;
in which " is the elasticity of substitutions between di¤erentiated labour. The
perfectly-competitive employment agency sells aggregated labour to producers
of nal goods at an aggregate wage index Wt: The agency chooses Nt (j) to
maximize nominal prots WtNt 
R 1
0
Wt(j)Nt (j), taking the wage rate Wt(j) and
the aggregate price index Wt as given. In optimum, the employment agencys
demand for type-j labour is given by
Nt (j) = Nt

Wt(j)
Wt
 "
: (2.3)
The aggregate wage index is then given by
Wt =
Z 1
0
Wt (j)
1 " dj
 1
1 "
:
6An implication of the former is that the exact distribution of shares across rms does not
matter. Hence, we do not specify dividends D in detail.
7Notice here that if  is small enough, it can be fully o¤set by a change in R, leaving the rest
of the economy una¤ected.
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To introduce wage stickiness, the model assumes a system of staggered wage
contract for the households: households of a certain type are able to change
their wages with probability 1   w at any given period of time. Whenever the
households are allowed to re-optimize their wage, they choose optimal W t to
maximize expected discounted sum of utilities, taking into account that they may
not be allowed change the wage rate, subject to the demand for labor equation
and the budget constraint. For simplicity, we do not consider wage indexation.
The households thus choose the wage rate to maximize
Et
1X
s=0
(w)
s
sY
k=0
k
"
C
1 C
t+s
1  C
  N;0
Nt+s (j)
1+N;1
1 + N;1
+ G;0
G
1 G;1
t+s
1  G;1
#
subject to (2.1) and (2.3). This problem gives us the wage setting equation
(wt )
1+"N;1 =
"
"  1
Nn;t
Nd;t
; (2.4)
where wt = W

t =Wt with
Nn;t = N;0N
1+N;1
t + Ettw
 
wt+1
"(1+N;1)Nn;t+1; (2.5)
Nd;t = wtNtC
 C
t (1  n;t) + Ettw
 
wt+1
" 1
Nd;t+1: (2.6)
We have dened wt = Wt=Wt 1 and wt = Wt=Pt: Given our wage setting
mechanism, the evolution of the aggregate wage index follows
1 = (1  w) (wt )1 " + w (wt )" 1 : (2.7)
2.3. Firms
There is a continuum of intermediate di¤erentiated goods indexed i. Firms
operating in sector i use a linear production technology to produce output
Yt(i) = Nt (i)
1= : (2.8)
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with  > 1. The price of an intermediate good i is Pt(i): The representative
nal goods producer that operates in a perfectly competitive environment sells Yt
which is an aggregate of Yt(i) according to
Yt =
Z 1
0
Yt (i)
 1
 di
 
 1
; (2.9)
in which  is the elasticity of substitutions between the di¤erentiated intermediate
products. The representative nal goods producing rm sells its product to the
consumers at a price Pt: It chooses the quantity of each di¤erentiated good to
maximize its prot PtYt  
R 1
0
Pt(i)Yt(i)di: As a result, demand for intermediate
good i is given by
Yt (i) = Yt

Pt(i)
Pt
 
: (2.10)
The aggregate price index is given by
Pt =
Z 1
0
Pt (i)
1  di
 1
1 
:
Price adjustment is assumed to be staggered too. It is assumed that in any given
period, the intermediate goods producing rms operating in a given sector are
able to re-optimize their price with a probability 1   p: Whenever the rms are
able to re-optimize their price, they choose the optimal P t to maximize expected
discounted sum of prots subject to the demand for their product dened in
equation (2.9). The problem of the rms is thus
max
P t
Et
1X
s=0
 
p
s sY
k=0
k

P t+sYt+s (i) Wt+sYt+s(i)

s:t: (2.10).
The solution for the optimal price is given by
(pt )
1+( 1) =

   1
Cn;t
Cd;t
; (2.11)
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where pt = P

t =Pt with
Cn;t = wtY

t C
 C
t + Ettp

t+1Cn;t+1; (2.12)
Cd;t = YtC
 C
t + Ettp
 1
t+1Cd;t+1: (2.13)
The dynamic of the aggregate price index follows
1 =
 
1  p

(pt )
1  + p
 1
t : (2.14)
2.4. Government
Monetary and scal authorities coordinate their action to maximize social welfare.
The monetary branch of the central government sets the nominal interest rate Rt,
and is constrained by the zero lower bound
Rt > 1 for all t: (2.15)
The scal authority sets the tax rate n;t and decides about government spending
Gt. The government ow budget constraint tracking the evoution of debt is then
given by
bt
Rt
=
bt 1
t
  n;twtNt +Gt   TLSt : (2.16)
2.5. Further equilibrium conditions
Given the intermediate goods producing rms production function (2.8), the
demand for intermediate goods (2.10), and the labor market clearing condition
Nt =
R 1
0
Nt (i) di, it can be shown that
stY

t = Nt (2.17)
where
st =
Z 1
0

Pt(i)
Pt
 
di =
 
1  p

(pt )
  + p

t st 1 (2.18)
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stands for price dispersion. The resource constraint is given by
Ct +Gt = Yt: (2.19)
An important equilibrium condition is the identity describing the evolution of
real wages in the economy
wt
wt 1
=
wt
t
: (2.20)
Chugh (2006) highlights the importance of this identity in generating endogenous
persistence in a sticky-price, sticky-wage economy.
2.6. Alternative versions of the model
We consider two versions of this model in which wages will be exible but the
steady state is the same as in the economy set out above. These versions are
distinct in one crucial aspect: labour market segmentation. This has a key
implication for the price determination in the economy and ultimately for the
degree of sluggishness in the response of the real economy to shocks and policy
action.
2.6.1. No labour market segmentation
When intermediate goods producing rms hire labour from the economy-wide
market, their pricing decision still a¤ects the demand for the di¤erentiated goods
produced by these rms but they consider the economy-wide real wage rate as
being una¤ected by their decision. This signicantly increases the sensitivity of
prices to shocks and accelerates real adjustment following disturbances and policy
action. This version of the model is the same as the one presented in the sections
above with w set to zero and relative wages set to one at all times. In the
presence of perfect insurance against idiosyncratic risk, we also need not consider
di¤erentiated types of labour and write Nt and Wt instead of their sector-specic
values in the householdsproblem.
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2.6.2. Segmented labour markets
In this version of the model, which is close to the setup of Eggertsson and
Woodford (2003) and Adam and Billi (2006), the intermediate goods producing
rms internalize the consequence of their pricing decision for demand for the
specic type of good, and the subsequent implications for the sectoral wage rate
through the demand for sector-specic labour. The rmsproblem gets modied
in a fundamental way. We now have rms choosing the optimal price to maximize
max
P t
Et
1X
s=0
 
p
s sY
k=0
k

P t+sYt+s (i) Wt+s (i)Yt+s(i)

s:t: (2.10)
and the denition of the real wage rate coming from the household problem.8
Following Woodford (2003), by symmetry between i and j, we can write
Wt (i) =
N;0Y
N;1
t

P t
Pt
 N;1
(1  n;t)C Ct
:
Equations (2.11) to (2.13) now become
(pt )
1+[(1+N;1) 1] =

   1
Cn;t
Cd;t
;
where pt = P

t =Pt with
Cn;t = Y
(1+N;1)
t C
 C
t + Ettp
(1+N;1)
t+1 Cn;t+1;
Cd;t = YtC
 C
t + Ettp
 1
t+1Cd;t+1:
8The introduction of sector-specicity raises questions about wage formation. In order to
avoid the need to consider monopsony in the labour market, we are implicitly assuming that there
are many rms and many households in each sector in the economy, i.e. a double continuum
of rms and households, as explained in Woodford (2003, Chapter 3). Hence, we have used the
plural form rmsand householdsof a certain type throughout the text.
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2.7. The policy problems
We shall consider the alternative versions of the model with di¤erent elements of
the policy makers toolbox switched on and o¤. In all cases, the objective will be
to nd sequences of endogenous variables that maximize an unweighted average
of welfare across households
Wt = Et
1X
s=0
()s
sY
k=0
k
"
Ct+s
1 C
1  C
  N;0
Nt+s
1+N;1
1 + N;1
mt+s + G;0
G
1 G;1
t+s
1  G;1
#
;
where
mt =
Z 1
0

Wt(j)
Wt
 "(1+N;1)
dj
= (1  w) (wt ) "(1+N;1) + w (wt )"(1+N;1)mt 1 (2.21)
is a measure of wage dispersion. This is equal to one for all t when wages are
exible. Moreover, in the case of the exible-wage economy with economy-wide
labour markets, the disutility of labour supply is expressed as
N;0
Z
Nt (j)
1+N;1
1 + N;1
dj =
N;0
1 + N;1
Y
(1+N;1)
t s
SLM
t
with sSLMt =
R hPt(i)
Pt
i (1+N;1)
di.
We shall be looking for policies that are optimal from a timeless perspective
(Woodford, 2003). In other words, we will be solving for time-invariant policy rules
assuming that preferences in the initial period are augmented so that the policy
maker does not take advantage of the fact that there had been no expectations
formed about the initial outcomes. The equilibrium conditions and the rst-order
conditions for each version of the model are listed in the Appendix.
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3. Parameterization and solution
We parameterize the model with values commonly used in the literature.9 We
refer to the model under this parameterization as our baselinecase. The discount
factor  is assumed to be 0.99. The discount factor shock ";1 is set to 0.02 to make
sure the economy hits the zero bound. The persistence of the innovation  is 0.9.
Thus, to determine when the natural rate of interest exceeds zero, one needs to
check at what quarter the product of t falls below 1. For the parameters of the
shock process, the discount factor and the persistence, the natural rate of interest
is above zero from t>7.10 We assume preferences are logarithmic in government
spending, set C to 1/6 and the inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply to 1.
11
The preference parameters N;0 and G;0 are set to 1 and 0.2 respectively. This
parameterization implies that steady-state government spending is close to 20
percent of steady-state output and the steady-state public debt is at 50 percent
of annualized GDP. The elasticity of susbstitution for goods  is set to 11. We
follow Chugh (2006) in setting the elasticity of substitution in the labour market "
to 21. The measure of price stickiness p is 0.75 implying an average four-quarter
duration or price contracts. The same value is used to parameterize the duration
of wage contracts when wages are sticky.12 The production function is assumed to
be linear in labour in the baseline case (as in Nakata, 2011 or Fernandez-Villaverde
et al., 2015).
When conducting sensitivity tests, the steady-state of our model is going to
9The parameter values are summarized in Table A.1 in the appendix.
10Werning (2012) shows this need not be equivalent to the point in time when the zero bound
stops binding, as the optimal interest rate reaction function may involve other terms that are
non-zero at the zero bound in addition to the natural rate. We only have a numerical solution
for the interest rate, and so cannot be more precise here.
11The value for C was also used in Jung et al. (2005), Nakata (2011), and is close to the
estimate of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997).
12In the exible-wage case, we set this parameter to zero but retain imperfect competition in
the labour market so that the exible-wage and sticky-wage economies are easier to compare.
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change. We maintain comparability by ensuring that in all cases the steady-state
debt-to-GDP ratio remains at 50 percent of GDP.
Given that we consider an event in which the economy departs far from its
steady state, and an inequality constraint becomes binding, we solve the model
in its non-linear form. We use the procedure described in detail in Nakata
(2011), which embeds the modied Newton method of Juillard et al. (1998)
into a shooting algorithm. As shown in Nakata (2011) there are signicant
accuracy gains from using a nonlinear solution relative to piecewise linear methods.
Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2015) also argue in favour of explicitly considering
nonlinearities.13
4. Results
There are two ways of dissecting our results. We shall look at comparisons across
di¤erent labour market arrangements. At the same time, we can understand a lot
about the intuition behind the various policy interventions and the transmission
of policy decisions by inspecting the same economy under di¤erent policies and
parameterizations. In this section, we draw conclusions from both of these
approaches. First, we look at the baseline model. Later, we demonstrate the
robustness of our intuition by conducting sensitivity tests.
4.1. The model under baseline parameterization
Our rst set of results is shown in Figure A.1 in which impulse response functions
to a discount factor shock for three types of economic settings are compared (a
model with exible wages and an economy-wide labour market, a model with
exible wages and segmented labour markets labelled SLM, and a model with
13For the sake of balance, we mention that Eggertsson and Singh (2016) tend to downplay the
importance of the di¤erences arising from approximation accuracy in a model similar to ours.
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sticky wages). Here, we assume that monetary policy is the only available tool to
stabilize the economy and that the scal solvency constraint is satised through
lump-sum taxes.
The models simulation suggests that the optimal ination volatility at the zero
lower bound is signicantly a¤ected by the nature of the labour markets in the
economy. When labour market sector specicity is introduced into the model with
exible wages, the optimal ination response to a given shock drops by as much as
one order of magnitude. In the model with sticky wages, ination volatility drops
even further. For all practical purposes, the dynamic of the optimal sticky-wage
economy is the same as the dynamic of an economy without price or nominal wage
ination. The gure also shows that in all three models, it is optimal to keep the
nominal interest rate at zero even after the zero bound ceases to bind. This result
is in line with the earlier literature. However, our key contribution is to show
that it is optimal to keep the interest rate at zero for even longer when labour
markets are segmented or nominal wage rigidities are present. This policy as we
demnonstrate is associated with smaller rather than larger expected ination in
the economy.
The intuition for this result is best understood in the context of the literature
that investigates the ability of New Keynesian models to generate realistic degrees
of output persistence (Edge, 2002, Ascari, 2003, Woodford, 2003, Chapter 3).
Changing the nature of the labour markets a¤ects the way price-setting rms
and/or wage-setting households respond to a demand contraction or expansion in
important ways. In a exible-wage economy, a shock with negative implications
for demand implies lower demand for labour and hence a downward pressure on
real wages (and, by implication, on marginal cost). In an economy with exible
wages and economy-wide labour markets, optimizing rms would reect the e¤ect
on wages to a large extent in their pricing decision. They would consider the fact
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that they may not be able to change the price soon as demand recovers (and in
fact overshoots) which will limit the extent to which prices drop. The rms also
consider that lowering prices induces substitution of demand from goods for which
prices remain unchanged. They can, however, recruit additional labour at the
prevailing economy-wide real wage rate, which is a cost unrelated to the industry
they operate in. With labour market segmentation, the rms need to consider
that price-change-induced intersectoral re-allocation of demand needs to be met by
hiring additional labour from a specic market with a specic wage rate. This will
be a¤ected by the need to meet the extra demand. This additional wage e¤ect
which would eat into rms prots introduces an element of caution in price
setting. As a consequence, there is a dampened price response in the rst place,
and a more persistence in the adjustment of the real economy. This mechanism
explains the much more subdued ination dynamic under segmented labour
markets as depicted in Figure A.1. With sticky nominal wages, marginal cost
adjusts sluggishly by construction. In addition, optimizing households consider
the broader implications of their wage decisions. Cutting (raising) wages too
much, whilst other households keep wages constant, might re-allocate demand
towards (from) their speciality, and the welfare cost of labour supply increases
on the margin. This reinforces wage stability already introduced via staggered
wage-setting. Overall, wages and, as a consequence, prices react little to shocks.
The downside of such price stability is that it imples a higher path for real
interest rates. In the absence of signicant expected ination, the future real boom
would be more subdued ceteris paribus and discounted more heavily. Relatively
low wealth implies lower consumption in the short run.
The monetary policy maker mitigates subdued price ination by keeping the
interest rate at zero for longer. This induces a greater real economy boom. It is
in this sense that we argue, following Werning (2012), that monetary policy in
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the liquidity trap is geared towards generating an expected real economy boom
rather than ination per se.
Overall, we still observe a signicantly larger drop in output and consumption
under segmented labour markets and nominal wage rigidity than with economy-
wide labour markets. However, an optimizing policy maker will be comfortable
with achieving more price stability at the expense of larger consumption (and
output) volatility. This is because strategic complementarity a¤ects not only
the degree to which marginal cost pressures translate into price movements (the
slope of the Phillips curve) but also the relative costliness of ination and output
variability from a welfare perspective. With more strategic complementarity, a
atter Phillips curve implies that there is larger misallocation of resources arising
from a given rate of ination.
Introducing government spending as a policy tool does not change the overall
picture markedly, which can be inferred from Figure A.2. This is consistent with
Schmidt (2013). In fact, as argued in Werning (2012), government spending policy
may have little to do with stabilization in the economy and instead be driven by
public nance considerations. In an economy with depressed private demand, the
marginal disutility of labour is low. An opportunisticpolicy maker deciding on
the optimal amount of public spending within the period following the Samuelson
rule will observe a small marginal rate of transformation between the public and
private goods (a drop in the relative price of public good), and will seek to increase
provision of valued G. The reverse holds in boom time.
To get a feel of the relative contribution of such considerations for government
spending policy, we do the following comparison. We take the output dynamic
from the optimal economy without scal variables in use as given, and ask
ourselves the question: What would an optimizing policy maker driven purely
by public nance considerations do if he/she saw output dynamic from the
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economy stabilized only by monetary policy? Our objective is thus to nd
GPF = arg maxG(C;C + G;G) with C taken as given.14 We then compare the
result of this exercise with the optimal dynamic of G in the various versions of
our New Keynesian economies with tax rates xed. We report the results in
Figure A.3. In line with Werning (2012), it is clear that the time prole as well
as the magnitude of the response in G is very well explained by public nance
considerations. One e¤ect of such leaning against the wind via G is that output
becomes more stable but by not too much. Figure A.5 which depicts optimal
dynamics in the sticky-wage economy under di¤erent policy options makes this
point clear.
Finally, we add tax policy to our set of policy instruments used to stabilize the
economy (see Figure A.4). The tax in our economy is labour income tax levied on
household earnings. This tax directly a¤ects marginal cost, and therefore, is an
e¤ective instrument deployed to deliver the desired evolution of prices. This view
of the role of tax policy is the same as in Correia et al. (2013). In our model,
taxes generally rise in the short-term which is consistent with the demand-side
considerations found in the literature. In particular, Benigno (2009), Eggertsson
(2011) and Nakata (2011) sought to justify tax increases through their impact on
(expected) ination and the real interest rate. This is in turn di¤erent from Bils
and Klenow (2008) who concentrated on the income e¤ect of a tax cut, which is the
reasoning probably closest to the philosophy behind similar real-world stimulus
measures. In our model, taxes lean against the wind: they counteract the dynamic
of marginal cost resulting primarily in a more stable ination rate. This is best
seen in the case of the sticky wage economy, as shown in Figure A.5, but the
intuition is valid in our exible wage economies as well. In a sticky-wage economy,
14We adjust the preferences of the policy maker with respect to G so that in the steady state,
he would choose the G=Y ratio that prevails in the steady state of our economies.
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with only a fraction of wage-setters reacting to tax policy (a¤ecting the net gains
from employment), tax policy needs to act more robustly to achieve the desired
aggregate outcome.
The overall budgetary impact of stabilization measures is close to zero initially
and public debt gradually falls towards a new lower steady state level. It is a
feature of the model that there is a continuum of steady states indexed by tax rates
with a corresponding debt level. As in Nakata (2011), the welfare-maximizing
tax rate is negative (eliminating the distortions to the steady state), and the
corresponding steady state features a higher output level, more government
spending and government holding net assets. Following the shock, the economy
moves into a steady state located closer to such an outcome.15
4.2. Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we explore the sensitivity of our results to parameters that
determine the degree of strategic complementarity in the economy. By looking
at parameters that drive the extent to which (downward) marginal cost pressures
arising from the a shock with severe demand implications are reected in price-
and wage-setting decisions of optimizing rms and households, we can verify if
the intuition set out in the previous section is correct. Finally, we check how the
results are a¤ected if the economy has an inherited public debt level signicantly
above and below the steady-state level.16
15The optimal debt dynamic would likely di¤er in a model with a di¤erent role for government
expenditures, given that the zero-rate interest policy would likely a¤ect public sector investment
decisions, for example, were they included in the model. Nevertheless, the model is relevant for
real-world considerations in the sense that it shows that stabilization and reduction of debt
levels towards a lower e¢ cient level can go hand in hand.
16The results are quite predictably sensitive to parameters driving nominal rigidity. When the
degree of wage stickiness is lowered (from four to two quarters on average), ination volatility
increases somewhat, and real volatility drops. Also, interest rates are kept at zero for only
one period longer than otherwise (two periods in the baseline calibration). However, the main
intuition still holds, and the quantitative impact is moderate.
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4.2.1. Concave production function
The link between the shape of the production function and strategic
complementarity is subtle. When the production function is no longer linear,
changes in the amount of labour are no longer proportional to the changes
in demand for production. Even in a non-segmented labour market, a prot-
maximizing price setter has to consider the situation that his production costs
will be more-than-proportionately a¤ected if additional demand comes his way
as a result of re-setting prices, whilst others keep theirs unchanged. This,
again, introduces caution into the price setting. As a consequence, we observe
reduced price volatility and increased output response in the economy with a non-
segmented labour market. The peak of the ination response drops by almost a
half of what it was with a linear production function and the time spent at the
zero bound lengthens in this economy to 10 periods versus the 9 periods in the
baseline version (see Figure A.6). This result conrms that real rigidity whether
induced by a particular labour market structure or other factors such as the shape
of the production function is an important determinant of the magnitude of the
desired ination response to shocks at the zero bound, and the time spent at the
zero lower bound.
Somewhat counterintuitively, in the sticky-wage model, ination volatility
increases moderately when production function is modelled to be concave.
Ination now behaves similarly to the economy with segmented labour markets.
The reason for this dynamic can be traced back to what happens in the labour
market in the exible price and wage version of our economy. The natural
level of output in the economy is determined as the intersection between labour
supply and labour demand functions in a (Y;w) plane (equations (2.4) and (2.11)
with the left-hand sides equal to one and the s equal to zero). With a linear
production function, the demand function is horizontal at a level determined by
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the steady-state markup. The labour supply function is upward sloping. If a shock
a¤ects labour supply, the equilibrium (natural) real wage rate will stay una¤ected.
With a concave production function, labour supply still slopes upwards. The
labour demand schedule, however, becomes downward sloping in the (Y;w) plane.
Marginal cost now depends on the quantity of production and the equilibrium real
wage rate thus must fall when output (labour supply) increases.
In the full version of the model, it is a feature of our economy that a future
boom is generated to stabilize the economy in the short term. In this boom,
labour supply needs to expand, and real wages need to fall as they loosely track
the natural rate. A mild ination facilitates this adjustment. This is shown
in Figure A.7. The role of ination in facilitating real wage adjustment in an
economy with sticky nominal wages has been highlighted in Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2005).17
4.2.2. Degree of competition
With lower substitutability across sectors, one would expect strategic
complementarity to play a smaller role in the price setting decision. Firms
should not be wary of bold moves, as sizeable demand shifts from or to sectors
where prices are not re-optimized happen less easily. If our story about strategic
complementarity is true, we should expect larger swings in ination, smaller
volatility in real variables, and a shorter time spent at the zero lower bound.
Figure A.8 conrms the intuition. It shows that the optimal economy with
a concave production function reverts back towards our baseline model with
linear production technology in terms of policies and outcomes once the degree of
competition (elasticity of subsitution in the goods market) is lowered.
17The shape of the production function may indeed be one of the main contributing factors
to the opposite ndings concerning optimal ination volatility by Chugh (2006).
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4.2.3. Other parameters
In addition to the parameters reported above, we also checked the sensitivity
with respect to the elasticity of substitution in the labour market " and the
elasticity of labour supply (the inverse of which is N;1): The results conrm the
intuition conveyed above but in comparison with the analysis of di¤erent forms
of the production function, the sensitivity to changes in the elasticity was less
pronounced for plausible values of parameters. This is consistent with Ascari
(2003) who makes a similar point.
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution C a¤ects the model in a variety
of ways, making sensitivity tests less straightforward. It a¤ects the transmission
of the shock and monetary policy in the model, and the wealth e¤ect of labour
supply (and hence the slope of the Phillips curve). A shock of a given magnitude
has smaller real consequences as before and policy action has to be more forceful
to have impact. In our sensitivity analysis, we have increased the magnitude of
the shock so that the depth of the contraction is similar to the one observed in the
exible-wage economy non-segmented labour markets above. The key messages
from our paper survive this modication. The di¤erences across specications,
however, become relatively small both in terms of policy and outcomes. Hence,
we conclude that the characterization of what constitutes goodpolicy in a New
Keynesian setup at the zero lower bound is most robust when the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution is relatively small.18
4.2.4. Initial level of debt
Burgert and Schmidt (2014) demonstrated that inherited debt level matters for
both monetary and scal policy at the zero lower bound. We examined the state-
18For the sake of brevity, the results from these exercises are not displayed here but are
available upon request from the authors.
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dependency of dynamics in our baseline economy by considering the following
two cases. In the high debtscenario, the initial level of public debt was set at
twice the steady-state level of debt, i.e. at 100 percent of GDP. In the low debt
scenario, the inherited indebtedness was half of the steady-state level of debt.
As in Burgert and Schmidt (2014), we nd that the magnitude of the ination
response is increasing, the initial increase in government spending is falling, and
the initial response in the tax rate is increasing in the level of inherited debt. Their
conclusions obtained under discretionary policy thus carry over into an economy
with time-consistent policy of the timeless perspectivetype. In line with much
of the New Keynesian literature (see, for instance, Benigno and Woodford, 2004
or Schmitt-Grohé, S. and M. Uribe, 2004), the initial deviation of debt from its
steady-state level is never fully undone.19 This is a manifestation of intertemporal
smoothing of welfare in tax and government spending policy.
As regards the interaction between the initial level of debt and labour market
structure, our results show that higher initial indebtedness tends to amplify the
di¤erences observed across economies with di¤erent structures when it comes to
ination volatility, in particular. In the economy with non-segmented labour
markets, a larger ination response (a deeper fall in the real interest rate) the
consideration behind which is to a great extent scal (directly and indirectly
through the tax rate) enables a smoother adjustment in real variables. In line
with that, government spending barely moves (there is a slight contraction).
Overall, as shown in Figure A.9, we see debt level falling well below its initial
level, and stabilizing at a level that is much higher than the calibrated steady-
state level.
19In the case of low inherited debt, the debt-to-GDP ratio falls further, for the same reason
as debt falls below its steady-state level in the baseline economy. To economize on space, we do
not display this case.
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5. Conclusions
We have shown that the optimal length of the forward commitment concerning
interest rates at the zero bound and key outcomes such as the magnitude of
expected ination or the depth of the recession under optimal policy depend
crucially on the assumed degree of real rigidity in the model. In addition to
simple parametric assumptions, more fundamental structural assumptions about
the nature of the labour market play an important role in this regard. Labour
market segmentation and the presence of staggered wage adjustment were shown
to have particularly signicant consequences for the type of policy one might wish
to implement in an economy hit by a large shock that depresses demand. In those
circumstances, it is a good idea for governments to lean against the wind in two
di¤erent ways. First, an increase in government spending when output is low (and
vice versa) stabilizes output (and prices) but this policy can be justied almost
wholly with reference to static public nance considerations. Second, an increase
in taxes when output is low (and vice versa) stabilizes prices via their impact on
marginal cost. The results interact in interesting ways with the initial conditions
in the economy. With higher inherited debt, scal sustainability considerations
matter more for monetary and tax policy and the explained di¤erences across
market structures grow larger.
The emphasis in the paper is on theory and intuition. Nevertheless, it should
be of interest to modellers working with medium-scale models in which sticky
wages are a standard feature. Di¤erent estimations of such models often yield
diametrically di¤erent parameter estimates. Our paper highlights that such shifts
in parameter values need not be inoccuous modications of the setup but may
require a di¤erent way of thinking about policy, particularly at the zero lower
bound.
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There is a lot more work to be done in the broadest sense to build better models
to study economic cycles and their welfare consequences. The smallest departure
from the present setup would be to have a model with a better account of the
welfare costs of unemployment or nancial market failures. Nevertheless, our
paper allows the reader to have a better understanding of how market structures
matter for macroeconomic policy and outcomes.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Figures and Tables
Table A.1: Baseline parameter values
Notation Description Value
 discount factor 0:99
C coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion 1=6
N;0 leisure preference parameter 1
N;1 inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply 1
G;0 government spending preference parameter 0:25
G;1 government spending preference parameter 1
 elasticity of substitution in the goods market 11
" elasticity of substitution in the labour market 21
p probability of no price adjustment 0:75
w probability of no wage adjustment 0:75
 production function parameter 1
";1 shock to the discount factor 0:02
 persistence of the shock 0:90
A.2. Optimality conditions
This section lists the equilibrium conditions dening the evolution of the optimal
economy under the various scenarios we consider.20 When scal policy instruments
are held constant, the respective rst-order condition from the Ramsey problem is
replaced by an equation that holds the value of the variable constant at its initial
steady-state level. Moreover, when nominal interest rates are the only tool used,
we assume that lump-sum taxes are available to satisfy the solvency constraint.
The conditions are time-invariant due to the fact that we automatically include
the terms that appear as a result of the penalty terms added to the objective
function under the timeless perspective approach. Such penalty terms summarize
20The !s are Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints of the Ramsey problem.
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Figure A.1: Optimal response of the baseline economy with scal variables held
constant and solvency issues ignored (SLM denotes segmented labour markets)
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Figure A.2: Optimal dynamics in economies in which the tax rate is held constant
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Figure A.4: Optimal dynamics with all policy instruments switched on
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Figure A.5: The sticky-wage economy under various policy scenarios
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Figure A.6: Optimal dynamics when production function is concave
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Figure A.7: Optimal dynamics in the sticky wage economy with di¤erent
production functions
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Figure A.8: Optimal dynamics in the exible-wage economy with economy-wide
labour markets under di¤erent degrees of product market competition
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Figure A.9: Optimal dynamics when initial public debt is twice the steady-state
value
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the commitments concerning the initial period that a policy maker would adhere
to should he be implementing policies he would have set for the current period in
the distant past. See Benigno and Woodford (2012) for details.
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A.2.2. Flexible wage economy with segmented labour markets
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A.2.3. Sticky-wage economy
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